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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) provides this court with appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering its prior decision denying 
Riverview Financial Corporation ("Riverview")1 summary judgment on Mariamercedes 
Power's ("Power") claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract? 
Questions of whether a trial court complied with the rules of civil procedure are 
questions of law. See Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20. 22 (Utah 1990). This court accords "no 
particular deference to the determinations of law made by the trial court but review[s] them 
for correctness." Id. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting Riverview summary judgment on 
Power's claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment contract? 
Summary Judgment is proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). "As a question of law, this decision is reviewed for correctness." Evans v. GTE 
Health Systems Inc.. 857 P.2d 974, 976 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
A determination of the issues presented requires an analysis of Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(b), 56, 60(b) and 61. Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6) and (f), Riverview has 
reproduced these rules at tab MA" of the attached Addendum. 
1
 Riverview was, at all times relevant, a parent company of Mrs. Fields Cookies and the 
actual employer of the corporate personnel working within the Mrs. Fields' organization. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action grows out of Power's discharge from employment with Riverview. In a 
five-count amended complaint filed in September of 1990, Power alleged that Riverview 
(1) breached an implied-in-fact employment contract to terminate her only "for cause", 
(2) breached a written contract to terminate her only in accordance with "express written 
company policies and procedures," (3) breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
(4) committed fraudulent misrepresentation and (5) committed intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. R. at 8-14. 
On December 18, 1990, Riverview moved to dismiss Power's claim for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. R. at 51-52. The trial court granted Riverview's motion by order dated April 10, 
1991. R. at 109-10. 
Shortly thereafter, Riverview moved for summary judgment on the four remaining 
claims. R. at 119-21. The trial court originally granted Riverview summary judgment on the 
tort claims and denied Riverview summary judgment on the contract claims. R. at 407-08. 
Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court granted Riverview summary judgment on the 
breach of written contract claim, leaving only Power's claim for breach of an implied-in-fact 
"for-cause" employment contact for trial. R. at 452 & 461-62.2 
2
 Riverview also filed a motion in limine to preclude Power "from introducing into 
evidence statements relating to a corporate outlook of 'fairness'" or Riverview's "nonbinding 
disciplinary policy." R. at 500. Power represents that this is "the very evidence on which 
Judge Wilkinson relied in denying Riverview summary judgment." Brief of Appellant at 5. 
The problem with Power's representation is that Judge Wilkinson never even remotely 
suggested why he denied Riverview summary judgment on the implied "for-cause" 
(continued...) 
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Nearly a year later, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decisions in 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. 
Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). Based upon these decisions, Riverview requested relief from 
the trial court's prior order denying it summary judgment on the implied "for-cause" 
employment contract claim. R. at 812-13. The trial court granted Riverview's motion in a 
Memorandum Decision dated March 18, 1993 (tab "B"), and, on May 25, 1993, entered a 
formal order awarding Riverview summary judgment on that claim (tab "C"). R. at 980-84 & 
986-87. 
On June 24, 1993, Power filed a notice of appeal (tab "D") from the trial court's 
May 25th order. R. at 989. Power has not appealed the dismissal of her claim for breach of a 
written contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation or 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 30, 1988, Power began working for Riverview as the administrative 
assistant to the three Senior Regional Directors of Operations. R. at 9, 126 & 145. 
2(... continued) 
employment contract claim. Power then represents that, Judge Noel denied the motion in 
limine, "specifically finding that Power's evidence of an implied-in-fact contract was 
sufficient to require jury consideration." Id. That never happened. Judge Noel actually 
ruled that while the evidence Riverview sought to exclude "may not, without something 
further, constitute a contract, they may have relevance when viewed together with all the 
facts and circumstances/ R. at 709. Judge Noel then went on to note that Judge Wilkinson 
had ruled that there existed "a question of fact sufficient to submit the matter to a jury." Id. 
Judge Noel, however, was not asked to, and did not, reconsider the propriety of Judge 
Wilkinson's determination. 
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2. The next day, December 1, 1988, Power filled out and signed an Application 
for Employment with Riverview. The beginning of the application provides in relevant part: 
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at anytime with or without cause. 
And immediately above Power's signature, the application reads: 
Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite 
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and 
salary, be terminated without any previous notice. 
R. at 126 & 141-42. 
3. In April of 1989, Power became the administrative assistant to Paul Baird, 
Director of Operations. R. at 126 & 146-48. 
4. The Riverview Policy and Procedures Manual that Power reviewed during her 
employment is replete with plain language declaring that employment with Riverview is at will: 
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate any employee at 
will. 
* * * 
At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at any time with or without cause. 
* * * 
GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION 
As noted, THE COMPANY reserves the right to terminate immediately. 
The following are violations that are Grounds for Immediate Termination: 
* * * 
The above list is not all inclusive. It bv no means covers all violations 
that could occur during employment, and THE COMPANY reserves the 
right to terminate at will. 
R. at 127, 151-55 & 167-71. 
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5. The Riverview Employee Handbook, which Power also reviewed, repeatedly 
proclaims in the simplest of terms that all employment with Riverview is at will: 
This handbook is provided as a guide which you may use to familiarize 
yourself with The Company. It is provided and is intended only as a 
helpful guide. It does not constitute, nor should it be construed to 
constitute an agreement or contract of employment, express or implied, or 
as a promise of treatment in any particular manner in any given situation. 
This handbook states only general Company guidelines. The Company 
may, at any time,in its sole discretion, modify or vary from anything 
stated in this handbook. 
This handbook supersedes all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and 
procedures issued by the Company. 
* * * 
The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team 
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause. 
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are 
an at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team 
member immediately 
* * * 
As stated earlier, The Company is an "at-will" employer. 
* * * 
II. Termination of Employment 
Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time, 
with or without cause. 
* * * 
Likewise, The Company is free to terminate an employee's employment 
at any time with or without cause. 
* * * 
As stated earlier, the Company is an "at will" employer. Therefore the 
above list is not all-inclusive. The Company will deal with each case 
individually, and this information should not be construed as a promise of 
a specific treatment in a given situation. 
79504.1 5 
These are some of the grounds for immediate termination. Of course, this 
list bv no means covers all violations that could occur during 
employment, and Mrs. Fields reserves the right to terminate at will. 
R. at 127-28, 156-58 & 173-201. 
6. On June 20, 1989, Power reviewed and signed a one-page Acknowledgment 
of Receipt expressly recognizing that her employment relationship with Riverview was at will. 
The Company reserves the right to transfer, promote, demote, or 
terminate me with or without cause at any time. With or without notice; 
and I reserve the right to resign at any time with or without notice. 
II. HANDBOOK 
Today I received a copy of The Company's Employee Handbook which 
has been prepared to give me some general information about company 
policy. I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other 
representation by a management official of The Company are intended to 
create a contract of employment. I understand that The Company and I 
have the same right to end my employment at any time for any reason. 
R. at 128 & 203. 
7. Riverview discharged Power on January 8, 1990, as part of a reduction in 
force necessitated by economic circumstances. More specifically, Riverview eliminated 
Power's administrative assistant position as part of an effort to cut costs and improve 
productivity at the corporate level. This effort resulted in the elimination of approximately 60 
positions (37.5% of the corporate personnel) over a three-year period. R. at 9, 128, 205-08, 
210-12, 214, 390 & 403-04; Reisner deposition (tab "E") at 6 & 54-55. 
8. Power's duties were spread among the remaining administrative assistants 
and her position, once eliminated, has never been subsequently filled. R. at 128 & 205-08; 
tab ME" at 6 & 84. 
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9. Tellingly, Power, in order to secure unemployment benefits, certified under 
penalty of fine and imprisonment that she had been laid off by Riverview. R. at 128 & 216. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court must affirm the trial court in all respects. First, Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 
P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993), makes it clear that the trial court acted correctly when it reconsidered 
its previous decision denying Riverview summary judgment on Power's implied-in-fact 
contract claim. Second, because no reasonable jury could have found that Power had 
overcome the presumption of at-will employment, the trial court also acted correctly when it 
granted Riverview summary judgment on that claim; alternatively, summary judgment was 
appropriate because the undisputed facts establish that Riverview terminated Power for good 
cause in a reduction in force. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Reconsideration of its Prior Decision Denying Riverview 
Summary Judgment on Power's Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-Cause" 
Employment Contract Was Entirely Appropriate. 
Power argues that Riverview relied upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) in bringing its 
Motion for Relief from Order, that "Riverview had to show unusual and exceptional 
circumstances" to prevail on that motion, and that Riverview presented "nothing extraordinary 
for . . . [the trial court] to consider." Brief of Appellant at 15. Power's analysis of this issue 
is wrong. 
"Any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a 
decision is formally rendered/ Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757. 760 (Utah 19851 Timm. 
851 P.2d 1178, is directly on-point. There, defendant, Althea Dewsnup, appealed the trial 
79504.1 7 
court's denial of several motions including one to reconsider a summary judgment. Id. at 
1179. "The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment, 
stating that 'no such motion exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.'" Id. at 1184. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered "the trial court to address the motion on its 
merits" holding "that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary judgment 
was 'subject to revision,'3 a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of requesting such a 
revision and is therefore permitted." Id. at 1185. See also Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc.. 
600 P.2d 534, 536-37 (Utah 1979); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 
44-45 (Utah App. 1988). 
Here, as in Timm. Riverview asked the trial court to reconsider its disposition of a 
summary judgment that was "subject to revision. "4 The trial court granted Riverview's 
request; the trial court would have erred if it had not done so. There it stands. 
Alternatively, even if the trial court did err in reconsidering the summary judgment, 
a remand for this reason would be inappropriate under the harmless error standard. Rule 61 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is controlling; it provides in pertinent part: 
3
 A summary "judgment is 'subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties'" unless certified as 
a final judgment. Timm. 851 P.2d at 1184 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)). 
4
 That Riverview's request for reconsideration was styled Defendant's Motion for Relief 
from Order and originally brought pursuant to rule 60(b) is of no consequence. First, the 
motion was properly brought under that rule. See Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130, 
131-32 (Utah 1978) (use of 60(b) as a mechanism for reconsidering denial of summary 
judgment upheld). Second, regardless, both Power and the trial court treated Riverview's 
motion as one for reconsideration. R. at 942, 955 & 983-84. 
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[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for . . . disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
An error substantially affects the rights of a party when "there is reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there would have been a different result." Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav 
Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1960). In light of the trial court's ruling that, as a matter 
of law, Power could not make out a claim for breach of an implied "for-cause" employment 
contract, there was no such error here for the result—dismissal of Power's claim—would have 
been the same except that all of the parties would have unnecessarily spent thousands of 
additional dollars in litigation costs. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Granted Riverview Summary Judgment on Power's 
Claim for Breach of an Implied "For-Cause" Employment Contract. 
Power next argues that she introduced sufficient "evidence of Riverview's intent and 
Power's reasonable expectation of 'for cause' contract terms" to avoid summary judgment.5 
Brief of Appellant at 20. Power's position is without merit. 
5
 Power, in the opening of her brief, phrases the issue at hand in terms of whether she 
had an implied-in-fact employment contract "whereby she could only be terminated for 
cause, after disciplinary counseling, and an opportunity to correct deficiencies." Brief of 
Appellant at 1-2. That is an incorrect statement of the issue. A correct statement is: 
Whether Power had an implied-in-fact employment contract whereby she could only be 
terminated "for cause"? To this end, Riverview notes (1) that Power's claim in her 
complaint for breach of an implied employment contract centers on whether "she was a 'for 
cause' employee;" (2) that Power is only appealing the trial court's decision granting 
Riverview summary judgment on her implied "for-cause" employment contract claim and 
(3) that Power's docketing statement (tab "F") defines the issue presented on appeal in terms 
of the "for-cause" standard. R. at 2 & 989. 
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A. Power Is Bound by the Provisions in the Riverview Employment 
Application and Handbooks Stating that Employment is Terminable At 
Will. 
Utah law presumes that employment for "no specified term of duration" is at will. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J
 f joined by 
Stewart, J.); see also id. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). An employee 
may overcome this presumption by proving the existence of an implied agreement with his or 
her employer to terminate the employment relationship only "for cause". Id. at 1044 & 1051. 
An implied agreement to terminate "for cause", however, cannot contradict an express 
contractual provision providing for employment at will. See Johnson v. Morton ThiokoL Inc.. 
818 P.2d 997, 1004 (Utah 1991) (citing Brehanv v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 
1991)); Berube. 771 P.2d at 1044. 
Here, Power and Riverview expressly memorialized in the Application for 
Employment Power signed when she began working for Riverview their understanding that 
Power's employment with Riverview was at will. Power's application reads: 
All employees of the Company are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at anytime with or without cause. 
* * * 
Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite 
period and may, regardless of the date of payment of my wages and 
salary, be terminated without any previous notice. 
Fact 1 2. Power and Riverview then expressly reaffirmed this understanding in the 
Acknowledgment Power signed in June of 1989: 
79504.1 10 
The Company reserves the right to transfer, promote, demote, or 
terminate me with or without cause at any time. With or without notice; 
and I reserve the right to resign at any time with or without notice. 
H. HANDBOOK 
Today I received a copy of The Company's Employee Handbook which 
has been prepared to give me some general information about company 
policy. I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other 
representation by a management official of The Company are intended to 
create a contract of employment. I understand that The Company and I 
have the same right to end my employment at any time for any reason. 
Fact 1 6.6 Additionally, Riverview also unequivocally disclaimed in its Policy and 
Procedures Manual and Employee Handbook any intent to fetter its right to discharge 
employees at will. See Fact U 2-3. Evidence of express recognition of at-will status by both 
employer and employee just does not get any better than Power's signed application and 
Acknowledgment and Riverview's disclaimers. 
Because the law bars the consideration of implied contractual terms that are 
inconsistent with express contractual terms where, as here, the express terms are laid out in a 
signed employment application or acknowledgment or in clear and conspicuous disclaimers, 
the trial court properly entered summary judgment. See Hodgson. 844 P.2d at 334 ("when an 
employee handbook contains a clear and conspicuous disclaimer of contractual liability, any 
6
 Power disputes that she acknowledged her at-will status by signing this one-page form 
as she "did not stop and think and analyze specific sentences/ Brief of Appellant at 22. 
Power's assertion is irrelevant. It is an elementary principle of contract jurisprudence that 
parties cannot avoid the consequences of what they have signed by later claiming that they 
did not read or understand it. See Lewis v. Penthouse Intern. Ltd.. 825 F. Supp. 131, 133 
(S.D. Texas 1992). 
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other agreement terms must be construed in light of the disclaimer"); Basich v. Target Stores. 
Inc.. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16336, *7 (Or. 1992) (disclaimer prevented "as a matter of law, 
the formation of an implied contract"); Bvkonen v. United Hospital. 479 N. W.2d 140, 142 
(N.D. 1992) ("presence of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in the employee handbook" 
preserved the presumption of at-will employment); Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1003 ("We also note 
that a number of jurisdictions have held that a clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of 
law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as implied-in-
fact contract terms"); Schloz v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. Inc.. 468 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Mich. 
1991) (signed acknowledgment of at-will status prevented enforcement of contrary implied 
contract); Grimes v. Allied Stores Corp.. 768 P.2d 528, 528-29 (Wash. App. 1989) 
(employee's "specific agreement in her application preempted] the arguably inconsistent 
policy manual"); Reid v. Sears. Roebuck and Co.. 790 F.2d 453, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1986) (at-
will provision in employment application constituted express contract barring any contrary 
implied contract). 
B. Power Had No More than a Mere Subjective Expectancy that She Would 
Be Terminated Only "For Cause". 
Even if Power had not agreed to an express term of employment at will, Riverview 
would still be entitled to summary judgment for two independent reasons. First, no reasonable 
jury could conclude that Power and Riverview ever settled upon an implied "for-cause" 
agreement restricting the company's right to discharge Power. And nif the evidence presented 
is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that the parties agreed to limit the employer's 
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right to terminate the employee, it is appropriate for a court to decide the issue as a matter of 
law." Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1001. 
In order for an implied "for-cause" term to exist, "it must meet the requirements for 
an offer of a unilateral contract." Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002. Accordingly, there must be an 
objective "manifestation of the employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and 
sufficiently definite to operate as a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation . . . 
must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe that the employer is making 
an offer of employment other than employment at will." Id. A subjective expectation of "for-
cause " employment does not create an enforceable contractual obligation. See Duncan v. 
Rolm-Spec Computers. 917 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sepanske v. Bendix 
Corp.. 384 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Mich App. 1985)). 
The facts of this case do not raise a triable issue as to the existence of an implied 
"for-causeM employment contract. (A) Power's employment application distinctly states in two 
separate places that the employment is at will and that an employee may be terminated at any 
time with or without notice. See Fact 12 . (B) Riverview's Policy and Procedures Manual 
affirms the at-will nature of employment with Riverview. For example, the Policy and 
Procedures Manual provides: 
In addition, the Company reserves the right to terminate anv employee at 
will. 
* * * 
At THE COMPANY all employees are "at-will" employees subject to 
termination at any time with or without cause. 
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Fact f 3. (C) Riverview's Employee Handbook insists upon the employee's at-will status in 
even greater detail. It provides, by way of example, that: 
The Company is an "at-will" employer which means that any and all team 
members are subject to termination at anytime with or without cause. 
Although we generally will follow a disciplinary process because we are 
an at-will employer, The Company reserves the right to terminate a team 
member immediately. 
* * * 
Every employee is free to terminate his or her employment at any time, 
with or without cause. 
* * * 
Likewise, The Company is free to terminate an employee's employment 
at any time with or without cause. 
Fact 5 4.7 (D) Finally, Power's signed Acknowledgment presents an unassailable, written 
testament of her understanding of the at-will nature of her employment relationship with 
Riverview. See Fact 1 6. 
No reasonable jury assessing these facts could conclude that Power reasonably 
believed that Riverview had offered her an implied-in-fact employment contract to be 
discharged only "for cause". Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate. See 
Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 332-34 (despite statement by employer's manager to employee during 
preemployment interview that employer "followed disciplinary procedures to give employees a 
7
 Notwithstanding the explicit statements in the Policy and Procedures Manual and the 
Employee Handbook to the contrary, Power asks this court to indelibly cast the disciplinary 
policy as an inviolate procedure and to ignore the plain language that delineates the policy as 
only a guideline that is not to be construed as a contract of employment, promise of specific 
treatment, or limitation on Riverview's right to discharge at will. See Fact ft 3-4. 
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chance to correct deficiencies," employee "could not have reasonably concluded that 
employment was other than at will" given disclaimers and fact that employee signed a "'New 
Employee Checklist' which stated that employment was at will"); Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1003 
("the only reasonable conclusion an employee or a juror could reach" given handbook's 
disclaimer is that employer "intended to retain the right to discharge for any reason"); 
Duncan. 917 F.2d 263-65 (in light of signed employment application specifying that 
employment was at will, statement by manager that employee "would never be terminated" as 
long as he "maintained his sales and met his quota each year" and existence of written 
performance improvement plan did not provide employee with "a reasonable basis for 
concluding that he would be terminated only for just cause"); Vollrath v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp.. 899 F.2d 533, 535 (6th Cir. 1990) (because company had issued disclaimer providing 
for at-will employment, employee could not have reasonably relied upon statements by plant 
manager that employee "would continue in employment as long as he continued to do his 
job"); De Hornev v. Bank of America. 879 F.2d 459, 466 (9th Cir. 1989) (employee could 
not have reasonably relied upon personnel policies promising "all employees fair treatment" in 
light of express acknowledgement of at-will status);8 Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty. 152 Cal. 
8
 Courts have had little trouble in rejecting the generalized assertions of job security and 
fairness on which Power relies as objective manifestations of an employer's intent to create 
an implied "for-cause" employment contract upon which an employee could reasonably rely. 
See, e.g.. Evans. 857 P.2d at 977 ("assurances of long-term employment" are "inadequate to 
create an implied contract" to terminate "for cause"); Fleming v. AT & T Information 
Services. Inc.. 878 F.2d 1472, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (statement in employer's documents 
promising "fair and consistent treatment" deemed irrelevant); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co.. 754 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1985) (statement in employer's personnel manual 
promising that "the company 'will sever the employment relationship in a fair and consistent 
manner' and 'will establish a fair and consistent method' to resolve employee disputes 
relating to employment'" too indefinite to form an implied contract). 
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App. 3d 467, 482 (Cal. App. 1984) (employee "could not have reasonably relied on any 
implied promise . . . which contradicted " the at-will provision contained in signed stock option 
agreement). 
Second, at a minimum, no reasonable jury could conclude that Power reasonably 
believed that any implied "for-cause" employment contract continued in force following the 
issuance of the Employee Handbook and her subsequent execution of the attached 
Acknowledgment. To this end, to the extent that written or oral representations form an 
implied "for-cause" term of an employment contract, it is a term of a unilateral contract. See 
Johnson. 818 P.2d at 1002; Brehanv. 812 P.2d at 56. As a result, an employer may 
unilaterally amend or abolish that term. Id.; Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co.. 855 F.2d 1225, 1235 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
The facts in this case establish: (A) that Power signed the Acknowledgment on 
June 20, 1989; (B) that the Acknowledgment denotes Power's and Riverview's understanding 
that Power was an at-will employee; (C) that the Employee Handbook superseded "all prior 
handbooks, manuals, policies and procedures issued" by the company; and (D) that the 
Employee Handbook clearly, conspicuously and repeatedly insists that all employment with 
Riverview is at will. See Fact M 4 & 6. The facts in this case also establish that the principal 
conduct that Power alleges gives rise to an implied "for-cause" employment contract 
(including the alleged statements made by Ms. Perry and those contained in the Policy and 
Procedures Manual and the video What We Stand For) precede her signing of the 
Acknowledgment. R. at 1070 & 1077-79; Brief of Appellant at 8. 
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Riverview exercised its right to unilaterally amend its employment relationship with 
Power to eliminate any implied "for-cause" provision. Consequently, Power's claim for 
breach of that provision cannot stand as a matter of law for whatever reasonable expectations 
Power "may have harbored . . . became unreasonable" when Riverview circulated its 
Employee Handbook definitively expressing its at-will policy and when Power acknowledged 
her at-will status. Pratt. 855 F.2d at 1235 (circulation of handbook including at-will 
disclaimer precluded employee from reasonably relying upon earlier statement made to him by 
manager that he would not be fired "without just cause"). 
Schloz. 468 N.W.2d 845, is illustrative. There, plaintiff brought a claim for, 
among other things, wrongful termination, alleging that she "had a contract not to be 
terminated for refusing to work on Sundays." Id. at 846. Specifically, plaintiff was told by 
her manager, through the personnel director, that she would not required to work on Sundays. 
Id. Based upon these representations, plaintiff accepted employment with defendant. Yet, for 
the next 12 years, defendant, on a sporadic basis, asked plaintiff to work on Sundays and 
plaintiff refused, citing her belief that she was not required to do so. Id. In 1982, defendant 
issued a policy manual. Attached to the manual was an acknowledgment, which plaintiff 
signed, that provided: 
I have read and fully understand the rules governing my 
employment with Montgomery Ward. I agree to employment with 
Montgomery Ward under the conditions explained. I understand these 
conditions can be changed by the Company, without notice, at any time. 
I also understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period 
and may, regardless of the time and manner of payment of any wages and 
salary, be terminated at any time, with or without cause, and with or 
without notice. 
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Id. In 1983, plaintiff was terminated for refusing to work on Sunday and, as a result, brought 
suit. Id. After a jury verdict in plaintiffs favor, defendant brought a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed with 
regard to plaintiffs wrongful termination claim holding that "regardless of whether an express 
oral contract actually existed at the time of her hiring, as a matter of law, plaintiff and 
Montgomery Ward later reached a mutual understanding with regard to termination through 
the sign-off sheet" and "that plaintiffs employment with Montgomery Ward was, as a matter 
of law, an employment-at-will relationship." Id. at 849. See also Butler v. Portland General 
Electric. 54 FEP Cases 357, 365 (Or. 1990) (employer's distribution of handbook with at-will 
disclaimer eliminated any just cause requirement arising out of prior statements made to 
employee by various managers and statements contained in previous handbook). 
C. Riverview Terminated Power As Part of a Reduction in Force. 
Finally, even assuming that Power had an employment contract permitting 
termination only "for cause", the trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment was 
appropriate. Discharging an employee in a reduction in force brought on by economic 
conditions constitutes a "for-cause" dismissal. See Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co.. 778 P.2d 885 
(Mont. 1989); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum. 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1986); 
Clutterham v. Coachmen Industries. Inc.. 215 Cal. Rptr. 795 (Cal. App. 1985). 
The undisputed facts establish that Riverview terminated Power as part of a 
reduction in force occasioned by business conditions. To this end, it is undisputed that 
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Riverview eliminated Power's position as part of a reorganization campaign meant to cut costs 
and that, as a result of this effort, Riverview eliminated 60 positions over a three-year period. 
Fact 17. It is also undisputed that Riverview distributed Power's duties among the remaining 
administrative assistants and has never filled Power's position. Fact 1 8. Indeed, Power 
admitted under threat of significant penalty for perjury that Riverview discharged her as part 
in a lay off. Fact 1 9.9 
On the strength of these undisputed facts, the trial court was obligated to find that 
Riverview had terminated Power with good cause as part of a reduction in force and that 
summary judgment was therefore appropriate. Linn v. Beneficial Commercial Corp.. 543 
9
 Power has taken some liberties with the record in an attempt to escape the fact that she 
was terminated as part of a reduction in force. By way of example, Power asserts that Mr. 
Baird testified "that Power was terminated for poor performance" and that, based upon that 
fact, a jury could "conclude that there was . . . no reduction in force. Brief of Appellant at 
25. Mr. Baird actually testified that he had received a directive in mid December 1989 to 
cut his staff by two positions, that he made the decision on which positions to cut based upon 
relative performance and that Power's administrative assistant position was one of the two 
lowest performing positions. R. at 205-08; Baird deposition (tab "G") at 4-11 & 139-40. 
Put simply, Mr. Baird decided to keep his most productive positions and to eliminate his 
least productive positions; common sense would not have a company downsize in any other 
way. By way of further example, Power claims that Mr. Baird "admits that people under his 
direction were reassigned to other positions, . . . and that he made no attempt to reassign 
Power/ Brief of Appellant at 26. What Mr. Baird actually said is that (1) when the 
position of Senior Regional Director of Operations for Mrs. Fields was later eliminated, the 
three Senior Regional Directors of Operations went into different positions and (2) he made a 
decision not try to place Power into another position "[b]ased on the company's position of 
overhead expenses for the upcoming year and the fact that there were no budgeted positions." 
R. at 342-43; tab "G" at 6. By way of final example, Power alleges that Daniel Murphy, 
Riverview's Director of Human Resources, testified "that changes in the number of personnel 
at Riverview were primarily the result of attrition and not as the result of any study." Brief 
of Appellant at 26. In fact, Mr. Murphy testified that over a three-year period, Riverview 
had downsized from 160 positions to 100 and that while the company "tried to handle it 
primarily by attrition" there were "several instances where work [was] . . . consolidated." 
R. at 404. 
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A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. 1988), is analogous. There, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs claim "that he was fired without good cause 
contrary to an implied promise of indefinite employment." Id. at 955. In reaching its 
determination, the court wrote: "We thus hold that an action for wrongful discharge does not 
generally lie for one whose loss of work is actuated by elimination of the job itself due to 
legitimate economic or business reasons, . . . ." Id. at 957. See also Coombs. 778 P.2d 885; 
Malmstrom. 231 Cal. Rptr. 820; Clutterham. 215 Cal. Rptr. 795. 
Power, like the plaintiff in Linn, was terminated as a result of a decision to 
eliminate her position for valid economic reasons. Power has failed to offer a single piece of 
evidence suggesting otherwise.10 Summary judgment in favor of Riverview was not only 
proper, it was required. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, Power cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment; 
additionally, Power cannot overcome the fact that she was terminated due to a reduction in 
force. Therefore, Riverview respectfully requests that this court affirm the order of the trial 
10
 Power finally asserts that Riverview failed to provide discovery on the reduction in 
force issue. Brief of Appellant at 2 & 26. What Power neglects to tell this court is that 
Riverview objected to this discovery as propounded primarily because it was unduly 
burdensome, oppressive and interposed to harass, that Power then brought a motion to 
compel and that the trial court denied her motion. R. at 653-63 & 808-09. Power has not 
appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to compel. 
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court granting Riverview summary judgment on Power's claim for breach of an implied "for-
cause" employment contract. 
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615 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 54 
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
nished, or the accounts or specific items thereof 
to be proved by oral examination of the account-
ing parties or upon written interrogatories or in 
such other manner as he directs, 
(e) Repor t 
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall 
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to 
him by the order of reference and, if required to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he 
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file 
the report with the clerk of the court and in an 
action to be tried without a jury, unless other-
wise directed by the order of reference, shall file 
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk 
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the 
filing. 
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be 
tried without a jury the court shall accept the 
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. 
Within 10 days after being served with notice of 
the filing of the report any party may serve writ-
ten objections thereto upon the other parties. Ap-
plication to the court for action upon the report 
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion 
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The 
court after hearing may adopt the report or may 
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or 
may receive further evidence or may recommit it 
with instructions. 
(3) In j u r y ac t ions . In an action to be tried by 
a jury the master shall not be directed to report 
the evidence. His findings upon the issues sub-
mitted to him are admissible as evidence of the 
matters found and may be read to the jury, sub-
ject to the ruling of the court upon any objections 
in point of law which may be made to the report. 
(4) S t ipu la t ion a s to f indings. The effect of a 
master's report is the same whether or not the 
parties have consented to the reference; but, 
when the parties stipulate that a master's find-
ings of fact shall be final, only questions of law 
arising upon the report shall thereafter be con-
sidered. 
(5) Draft r epor t . Before filing his report a 
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for 
all parties for the purpose of receiving their sug-
gestions. 
(0 Object ions to a p p o i n t m e n t of mas t e r . A 
party may object to the appointment of any person as 
a master on the same grounds as a party maylchal-
lenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial 
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and 
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a 
motion. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
P A R T VII . 
J U D G M E N T . 
Rule 54. J u d g m e n t s ; cos ts . 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these 
rules includes a decree and any order from which an 
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of 
prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or in-
volving multiple parties. When more than one 
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than ail of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of 
such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. 
(c) Demand for j u d g m e n t 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when 
the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as be-
tween or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by de fau l t A judgment by de-
fault shall not be different in kind from, or ex-
ceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs . 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of 
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed 
as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers 
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed . The party who claims his 
costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memoran-
dum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court 
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
•and that the disbursements have been necessar-
ily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party 
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within 
seven days after service of the memorandum of 
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed 
by the court in whicn the judgment was ren-
dered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after 
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the 
service and filing of the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and 
filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) In t e r e s t and cos t s to be included in the 
j u d g m e n t The clerk must include in any judgment 
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
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from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Rule 55. Default. 
(a) Defau l t 
(1) En t ry . When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
(2) Notice to p a r t y in defaul t . After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) J u d g m e n t . Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) By the c lerk . When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the cour t . In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
ic) Set t ing as ide defaul t . For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and. if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60<b). 1 . 
td> Plaintiffs, c o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , cross-claim-
an t s . The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plain-
tiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) J u d g m e n t aga in s t t he s t a t e o r officer o r 
a g e n c y thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t 
(a) For c l a iman t . A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg. 
ment by the adverse party ,~move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on mot ion . If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts tha t appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) F o r m of affidavits; fu r the r t es t imony; de-
fense r equ i r ed . Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to tne matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing tha t 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court a t any time tha t 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
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ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. En t ry . 
(a) J u d g m e n t u p o n the verd ic t of a j u ry . Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) J u d g m e n t in o the r cases . Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
<c) When j u d g m e n t en te red ; notation in regis-
ter of ac t ions a n d j u d g m e n t docke t . A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of s igning or en t ry of j u d g m e n t . The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision 
(e> J u d g m e n t after d e a t h of a pa r ty . If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(f) J u d g m e n t by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the. clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be errtered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect-
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due. it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of j u d g m e n t 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may he satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following m a n n e r (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
\e) Fi l ing transcript of satisfaction in other 
count ies . When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed. There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall 
have the same effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of j u d g m e n t 
(a) G r o u n d s . Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 , 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, tha t on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
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abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not. with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision <a)i 1), 
(2), (3). or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial in based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion. The op-
posing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
<d> On init iat ive of court. Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a parly, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
»e» Motion to a l te r or a m e n d a j u d g m e n t . A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or o rder . 
•a> Clerical mis takes . Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, oruers or other parts of the record and error.-
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and attvr such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency ot an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court. a.-.u thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may he so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mis takes ; i nadve r t ence ; excusab le neglect; 
newly d i scovered ev idence ; f raud, etc . On mouon 
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence couid not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6> the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prio 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera, 
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), o } 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment. 
(a) S tay upon entry of judgment. Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs. 
(b* Stay on mot ion for new trial or for judg-
ment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a 
luduioeru or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
rnoti'in for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
•c- Injunct ion pend ing a p p e a l . When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
Lrra:it::i;j. ci.-suivir.^. or denying an injunction, the 
court m it- discretion may suspend, modify, restore, 
or gram an injunction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the secuntv of the rights of the adverse party. 
• d» Stay u p o n appea l . When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may ob-
tain a sta>. uniess such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or tnese rules. The bond may be given at or 
alter th- time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
^ elective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court 
*e i S tay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
m AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL CORP. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
CASE # 10741 
The above matter came on for argument on the defendant's "Motion for Relief from 
Order." The Plaintiff was represented by Russell c Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde. The 
Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno G. Himonas. The court heard 
the argument of counsel, reviewed the pleadings on file and now renders this it's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This action arises out of the alleged termination of the employment of the plaintiff by the 
defendant. Discovery has been concluded and the information relating to the parties 
employment relationship has been developed and is essentially undisputed for the purposes of 
this decision. 
The plaintiff prepared and submitted an employment application December 1, 1988. She 
was hired and worked for approximately thirteen (13) months. When seeking employment 
she completed the application which stated as follows: 
We are an equal opportunity employer dedicated to a policy of non-
discrimination in employment on any basis including race, creed, color, age, 
sex, religion, or national origin. All employees of the Company are at-will 
employees subject to termination at any time with or without cause, (emphasis 
added) 
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Later, on June 20, 1989 while employed and after some initial indoctrination as to the 
company's policies and procedures, the plaintiff was given an Employee's Handbook which 
contained additional and lengthy instructions as to the company's expectations and the 
employee's expectations. In the "Acknowledgement of Receipt" signed by the plaintiff is this 
language in standard size and consistently obvious location: 
I understand that neither this Handbook nor any other representation by a 
management official of The Company are intended to create a contract of 
employment. I understand that The Company and I have the same right to end 
my employment at any time for any reason, (emphasis added) 
In addition, in the Employee's Handbook states, "Every employee is free to terminate his 
or her employment at any time, with or without cause." 
It is clear from the foregoing that the company and the employee intended to and did 
create an "at-will" employment relationship. 
Thereafter, Ms. Power was terminated as a result of a "reduction in force." She has 
sued claiming that the employment relationship had been modified from "at-will" to an 
"implied-in-fact" employment. 
The court inquired of counsel as to what facts occurred to render the change. The 
defendant, naturally, said the relationship remained "at will." The plaintiff said that the 
relationship had changed due to the following alleged facts: 1. The company had engaged 
in a course of conduct that indicated it felt otherwise than an "at will" relationship. This 
course included a lengthy video tape in which the principals stated among other things that 
[2] 
they would be fair in dealing with employee mistakes and errors etc. 2. The plaintiff had 
been promised a "new position," if she continued to work out. 3. The plaintiff was 
promised consideration for a future job with a mail order facility. 4. The plaintiff was 
given positive job reports and was even used to train other new employees. 5. The plaintiff, 
when terminated, had not been previously warned of impending termination or deficient work 
performance but was told only that there was a reduction in force. Assuming each of the 
above to be true, the company could still reduce it's force and release the plaintiff "at will." 
None of the above give the plaintiff a basis to conclude that her employment had been 
modified from "at will." 
The plaintiff feels that the issue now before the court had twice been considered by 
Judges Wilkinson and Noel when previously assigned to Summit County. There is some 
dispute on that since the defendant indicates that Judge Noel only considered matters in 
Limine and not the matter of Summary Judgment and Judge Wilkinson did not have the 
benefit of recent decisions of the Supreme Court. (Sanderson v. First Security Leasing 
Company 201 Ut Adv Rep 18 [Dec. 1992] and Hodgson v. Bunzi Utah, Inc., 202 Ut Adv 
Rep 22 [Dec. 1992] ) 
This court recognizes the undesirable nature of the master calendar system now followed 
in Summit County were the Judge will change as the assignment changes. However, it is 
incumbent on the Judge assigned to do the best he or she can in dealing with a case to see 
that the matter is handled consistent with the Judge's best judgment under the circumstances. 
[3] 
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With that in mind, it is my opinion that the Motion for Relief from Order should be and the 
same is hereby granted. 
Considering the above cases, the undersigned feels that had the cases been available to 
Judge Wilkinson, his decision would have been otherwise. I submit my reasoning as follow: 
While this court recognizes, as stated by Justice Zimmerman in Sanderson, that: 
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual question committed 
to the sound discretion of the jury. (p. 19) 
the question must be buttressed by some clear action to deviate from the "at-will" 
relationship. In Sanderson it was the promise to allow Mr. Sanderson, while ill, to "take all 
the time...needed, (and) do what needed to (be) done" to recover. Thus the "at-will" 
employment was changed to allow Mr. Sanderson to remain off work while recovering and 
further to allow him to retain the confidence that he would not be fired for doing so. The 
subsequent question of fact at trial was whether Mr. Sanderson had been terminated for 
absence or some for some other reason. 
In the Hodgson case, Justice Howe stated the issue to be whether the defendant had 
"modified" the "at-will employment status" to this plaintiff by "issuing warnings to four 
(other) employees" prior to termination. The court then stated: 
In order for conduct and oral statements to establish an implied-in-fact 
contract, such evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of 
at-will employment and any inconsistent written policies and disclaimers. 
In the instant case, the court finds that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the fact that 
[4] 
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the evidence was not strong enough to overcome the presumption that an "at will" 
relationship continued and that the company had done nothing to change the "at-will" 
relationship with this plaintiff. All assurances remained consistent with the "at-will" status 
and when it became necessary to reduce employees, the plaintiff was let go for that reason 
alone. 
The court grants the defendant's motion for Summary Judgment finding that the plaintiff 
was an "at-will" employee and the alleged "facts" claimed by the plaintiff are insufficient as 
a matter of law to allow the matter to go to the jury for consideration. 
Mr. Himonas is requested to prepare Findings and a Judgment consistent herewith and 
with the record as plead and argued. 
(Following the preparation of the foregoing, the plaintiffs counsel submitted a "Supplemental 
Brief to Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order." The court has reviewed the 
pleading with the accompanying cases and finds that the record fails to reveal sufficient 
information for the court to conclude that the plaintiff could have "justifiably" relied on 
additional expressed or implied policies being applicable to her employment. The fact that 
employees may have been dealt with on disciplinary matters in a different way does not 
change the fact that the plaintiffs position was illiminated due to a reduction in force.) 
[5] 
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Deno G. Himonas (USB #5483) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVER VIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER 
Civil No. 10741 
Defendant's Motion for Relief for Order came on for argument on March 18, 
1993. The Plaintiff was represented by Russell C. Fericks and Nathan R. Hyde of Richards, 
Brandt, Miller & Nelson. The Defendant was represented by Randall N. Skanchy and Deno 
G. Himonas of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. The Court, having heard the 
arguments of counsel and having reviewed the pleadings on file and the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Dec. 8, 1992), and in 
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Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Dec. 23, 1992), is of the opinion that the 
undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Plaintiffs employment relationship with 
Defendant was "at-will" and that, regardless, Defendant terminated Plaintiff "for cause" as 
part of a reduction-in-force. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES 
that Defendant's Motion for Relief from Order is granted; 
FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that the Court's prior ruling 
denying Defendant summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of an alleged implied-
in-fact employment contract to be terminated only "for cause" (Count I) is vacated; and 
FINALLY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted in its entirety. 
DATED this of May, 1993. 
^ ^ Y THE COURT **^V «?'**, 
- £ ^ S—^£—*-- . - i . . ^* 
District Cou 2JM 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Resell C. Fe ' ^^ ^^^ 
Nathan R. Hyde 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
^i£42^J^*6f7to^ I / 
Randall N. SJcanchy 
Deno G. Himonas 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the JB* day of May, 1993, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument to be hand-delivered upon: 
Russell C. Fericks 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 800 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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RUSSELL C. FERICKS [A3793] 
NATHAN R. HYDE [A5489] 
GERALD J. LALLATIN [A5986] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
Fax N o . : (801) 532-5506 
No. 
F I L E D 
JUN 2 4 1993 
Clerk * f Summit County 
OfrntiCtmi #t?L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 10741 
Plaintiff Mariamercedes Power, by and through her counsel 
of record, hereby gives notice pursuant to Rule 3, Utah R. App. P. 
that she appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah the "Order on 
Defendants Motion for Relief from Order" entered by this District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Summit County, 
State of Utah on May 25, 1993 by the Honorable David S. Young. 
Dated this 23rd day of June, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Z&4teS{ 
JSSELL V^yPERICKS 
JATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J . LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Plaint i f f 
nnnno 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by the 
Court, has been mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this^r? ™ 
day of 7//s*-v- - # 1993, to the following: 
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
PEDRC 
vs. 
MRS. 
> TIRADO, ) 
FIELDS 
Plaintiff, ) 
COOKIES, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Deposition of: 
Cindy Reisner 
No. 10755 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of January, 
1991, the deposition of Cindy Reisner was taken pursuant to 
notice, commencing at 9:00 a.m. of said day at 50 South Main 
Street, #700, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Diana Kent, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. 
COPY 
Reporting Service, Inc. 
322 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
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A. A year and-a-half. 
Q. And then you were promoted to — 
A. Personnel Manager. 
Q. How does Personnel Manager differ from Human 
Resources, Director of Human Resources? 
A. I'm over the entire department now. 
Q. How long were you the Personnel Manager? 
A. Two and-a-half years, I believe. No. Three 
years. From 1987 to 1990. 
Q. 
cases, you 
A. 
Q. 
Resources? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
department 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So at the time of the events involved in these 
were the Personnel Manager? 
Thatfs correct. 
When did you become the Director of Human 
Officially, January 2, 1991. 
Unofficially? 
I was told December 31, 1990. 
Are you a department head? 
Yes, I am. 
As the Personnel Manager, who was your 
head? 
Dan Murphy. 
Have you taken over Dan Murphy*s duties? 
Yes, I have. 
Is that a result of his moving onto other 
54 
1 A. Being laid off is when there is no need for the 
2 position or there are too many employees in a store or the 
3 store is closing. That type of thing. And being 
4 terminated, I usually think if we are terminating someone, 
5 we are firing someone. 
6 Q. Termination means firing to you? 
7 MR. HIMONES: Let me offer go ahead first. 
8 A. Not totally. Termination is terminating one's 
9 employment, regardless of the reason. That's why it is 
10 called "termination". 
11 MR. HIMONES: Let me offer a clarification, and this 
12 might help you. There is one spot in one of the 
13 Interrogatory answers that we need to correct where it ends 
14 with the word "termination". There is an omission there. 
15 It should be "for cause" afterwards, to make it consistent 
16 with all the other pleadings. If that did or didn't spark 
17 your inquiry, I don't know. 
18 Q. Well, I'm just wondering in your professional 
19 field of Human Resources, "termination" means to end the 
20 employment. Right? 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. And "firing" is ending the employment because 
23 the employee did something wrong? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q* And "laid off" is ending the employment because 
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the company's economic circumstances justify it? 
A. 
Q. 
force", in 
A. 
Q. 
other than 
A. 
That's correct. 
Is "laid off" synonymous with "reduction in 
your mind? 
Yes. 
Okay. Does "reduction in force" mean something 
"laid off"? 
No. 
Q. Was Miss Power terminated for a reduction in 
force? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or was she fired for bad job performance? 
A. No. 
Q. Was Pedro Tirado terminated for bad job 
performance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he was fired? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was Joe Trembly fired? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He wasnft laid off? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know who Mariamercedes Power is? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you first become aware of her? 
84 
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department to the Training Department in early '89. I don't 
remember the exact date. Once she transferred to the 
Training Department, she did no further work for me. 
Q. Is she still with the company? 
A. Yes, she is. 
Q. In the Park City office? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who absorbed the responsibilities 
that Miss Power was performing before her termination? 
A. E. G. Perry and her assistant. 
Q. Who is E. G.'s assistant? 
A. Lisa Richards. 
Q. Were you involved in Amanda Aratta's 
termination? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. You weren't consulted on that before it was 
done? 
A. Not me personally, no. 
Q. Who was? 
A. I believe Dan Murphy may have been. 
Q. Who would he have been consulted by? 
MR. HIMONES: Objection. Lack of foundation. 
A. I really don't know for sure who would have 
consulted him. It could have been Paul or the RDO. They 
talked to all of us, to both of us, on occasion. But I 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAMERCEDES POWER 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RIVERVIEW FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
(May be assigned to Court of 
Appeals) 
Case No. 930315 
Appellant Mariamercedes Power ("Power"), by and through 
her counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, submits the following Docketing Statement. 
1. JURISDICTION: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
of Utah is conferred by U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 1992. 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: This is an appeal from a 
summary judgment in the Third Judicial District Court of Summit 
County, State of Utah, Judge David S. Young presiding. 
3. DATE OF JUDGMENT: The "Order on Defendant's Motion 
for Relief From Order" which is the subject of this appeal was 
entered by the Trial Court on May 25, 1993 and resulted in 
dismissal of all of Power's claims and causes of action. 
4. DATE OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: Notice of Appeal was 
filed with the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County on 
June 24, 1993, and with the Utah Supreme Court on June 25, 1993. 
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS: Plaintiff and Appellant Power 
was hired by Defendant and Appellee Riverview Financial Corporation 
("Riverview") on December 1, 1988 and was terminated after 
approximately 13 months of employment. Power brought an action 
against Riverview in the Third Judicial District Court for Summit 
County, State of Utah alleging that she had been improperly 
terminated in violation of an implied-in-fact agreement that she 
would only be terminated for cause. 
In various pleadings, Power alleged that statements in 
the company documents and explicit statements and actions by 
company executives created an implied-in-fact agreement that she 
would not be terminated without cause. She further alleged that 
she was terminated without cause and not as part of a reduction in 
force. 
On November 27, 1991, a hearing was held in the Third 
Judicial District, Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding, on Riverview's 
Motion for Summary Judgement in which it asked for dismissal of all 
causes of action. Riverview alleged that Power was an at-will 
employee who had been terminated as part of a reduction in force. 
Judge Wilkinson dismissed some of Power's causes of action but 
denied the motion to dismiss the claims of an implied-in-fact 
contract. 
2 
Before an order was entered, Riverview filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the court's denial of its requested summary 
judgment. In March 1992, Judge Wilkinson, having considered the 
Motion For Reconsideration, entered an order leaving the implied-
in-fact contact claim intact. 
Trial on the implied-in-fact contract claims was 
commenced in Summit County, Judge Frank G. Noel presiding. As part 
of the trial proceedings, Riverview presented a motion in limine, 
again asking that Power's proferred evidence of an implied-in-fact 
contract cause of action not be allowed into evidence. Judge Noel 
denied the motion, ruling that the existence of an implied-in-fact 
contract was a question of fact for the jury based on the totality 
of the evididence. On the second day of the trial after plaintiff 
had commenced presentation of her case, a mistrial occurred due to 
the disqualification of one of the jurors. 
On February 25, 1993, Riverview filed a Motion for Relief 
From Order asking the Third District Court to again reconsider the 
court's Judge Wilkinson's denial of Riverview' Motion For Summary 
Judgment on Power's claim of an alleged implied-in-fact employment 
contract. Riverview cited the publication of two cases decided by 
the Utah Supreme Court as the basis for reconsideration. Power 
objected to the motion both on the merits and on the propriety of 
a district court judge overruling the "law of the case" as 
established by another district court judge. 
On April 25, 1993, Judge Young entered an order vacating 
Judge Wilkinson's March 1992 order, thereby granting MFC's Motion 
3 
For Summary Judgment for dismissal of the implied-in-fact contract 
claims, stating that "the undisputed facts establish as a matter of 
law" that Power's employment was at-will. 
6. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL: 
a. Was summary dismissal of Power's claims in 
error because disputed issues of material facts, when considered in 
a light most favorable to Power, establish an employment 
relationship terminable for cause only. 
b. Was the District Court in error in arriving at 
a summary decision that Power was terminated as part of a 
"reduction in force" when that fact was controverted by Power. 
c. Was the District Court in error in allowing 
Riverview's motion to be heard since it no new facts were presented 
and such a motion is contrary to the "law of the case" doctrine, 
and because a District Court judge may not vacate the prior 
decision of another District Court judge. 
Standard of Review: All issues are challenges to 
conclusions of law and are therefore reviewable without according 
deference to the Trial Court's conclusions of law, and viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to Appellants. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
7. CITATIONS: 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
Sanderson v. First Security Leasing. 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992). 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). 
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Berube v. Fashion Ctr. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991). 
Harvard v. Harward. 526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974) 
Peav v. Peav. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980) 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Contractors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
8. PRIOR APPEALS: There have been no prior appeals in 
this case. 
DATED this _£_ day of July, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
RpSSELLvC^ FERICKS 
JATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 10th day of January, 
1991, the deposition of Paul Baird was taken pursuant to 
notice, commencing at 1:30 p.m. of said day at 50 South 
Main, #700, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Diana Kent, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah. 
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for Diana 
A. 
Q. 
record. 
1
 A. 
to be able to 
All right. 
State your 
My name is 
take 
full 
Paul 
down the answer. 
name and address for 
Richardson Baird and 
the 
I reside 
4 
at 3006 East Dickens Place in Salt Lake City. 
Q. Why did you terminate Mariamercedes Power? 
A. Maria's position was eliminated and, as a 
result of that, her employment with the company was severed. 
Q. It had nothing to do with her job performance? 
A. No. 
Q. So her performance was fine for you? 
A. Her performance was not germane to the 
position. 
(Discussion off the record was held.) 
A. I eliminated the position as a budgetary issue. 
The decision of which position to eliminate was based on the 
way the position had performed for me in the eight months 
that I had it. 
Q. The way the position had performed or the way 
Maria had performed? 
A. I think they are one and the same. She is the 
only person who had been in the position. 
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Q. So, in your mind, it was both her performance 
and the need to eliminate the position that caused her 
termination? 
A. No. The need to eliminate the position was one 
separate event. And then I had to, as an executive and a 
department head, make a decision as to which position got 
eliminated. Based on the amount of productivity and 
assistance that I was getting, I made the decision that the 
Administrative Assistant position is the one I would 
eliminate. 
Q. What were the other choices? 
A. Two positions in technical support. These are 
people who write computer programs, deal with computers, et 
cetera. 
Q. So you kept the technical and let the 
operational go? 
A. Right. The Administrative Assistant position. 
Q. Before you terminated Mariamercedes, you also 
terminated Amanda Aratta. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you terminated her on the last day of 
December, I think, 1989? 
A. I don't recall the date. 
Q. It was before Miss Power was terminated. 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
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Q. Did you terminate Miss Arattafs position or did 
you terminate Miss Aratta? 
A, We reduced the position. We had two 
Administrative Assistants. We went to one, and subsequently 
went to zero. 
Q. So you eliminated Miss Arattafs position, as 
well? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Now, did you make any effort to transfer Miss 
Power to another position in the company? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Based on the company's position of overhead 
expenses for the upcoming year and the fact that there were 
no budgeted positions, I felt there was no point in trying 
to place her inside the company. 
Q. Same thing with Miss Aratta? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that the company's policy, to eliminate 
people and positions simultaneously? 
A. I don't know that there is any such policy. 
Q. Is that your practice, Paul Baird? 
A. I would have to say that each situation is 
unique, depending on the particulars of the business at the 
point in time. There's a lot of factors to be involved. In 
1 I this situation, given that it was a corporate office 
2 | position and the relative number of available positions was 
3 | limited, in that case it was a very good decision. There 
4 I are times, in field operations positions, where you may have 
5 twelve district sales managers in a city and you may offer a 
6 person a position as a store manager because they are 
7 available. So given the availability, I think that that 
8 predominantly drives it. 
9 Q. Okay. So you think that you had good cause to 
10 terminate her; Miss Power. 
11 MR. HIMONES: Object. That's vague and ambiguous. 
12 "Good cause" could mean something else in the employment 
13 setting. 
14 A. As an employer who clearly employees at will, 
15 we have the right to terminate at any point in time. So the 
16 issue of cause was not entered into. 
17 Q. Let's review what you just testified to, Paul. 
18 You eliminated Mariamercedes Power because of economic 
19 circumstances, apparently. Correct? 
2 0 A, Correct. 
21 Q. And because her performance was such that you 
22 didn't feel like it would be beneficial to the company to 
23 transfer her to another position. Is that correct? 
24 A. No. I stated, I believe, that the decision to 
25 eliminate a position in the company was economic. The 
1 I decision of which position was eliminated was based on the 
2 | relative benefit each position would bring me in the new 
3 I year, with the reduced assistance from all areas of the 
4 business, 
5 Q. So it didn't have anything to do with 
6 Mariamercedesfs performance, per sef but the fact that that 
7 position hadn't been a constructive part of your line-up. 
8 MR. HIMONES: I object to that characterization. His 
9 testimony is what it is. That casts it in a slightly 
10 different light. 
11 Q. Well, I intended to. And I'm testing the 
12 limits of his fairly obscure explanation. So my question, 
13 again, is, your decision to eliminate the position, and 
14 consequently Miss Power, was because the position had not 
15 been profitable for you and, therefore, it was a position 
16 you wanted to eliminate in the line-up. 
17 MR. HIMONES: Objection. Asked and answered. Go 
18 ahead. 
19 A. The position the decision to eliminate 
20 head count in the office as to number of positions working 
21 for me was one decision. Once that decision was made, then 
22 the decision of which position was eliminated was based on 
2 3 my judgment as to which one would provide me the most 
24 assistance in the upcoming year. That decision and judgment 
25 are based on the performance of all the individuals 
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involved. 
Q. 
because you 
A. 
good person. 
Q. 
9 
Okay. Now, you didn't terminate Mariamercedes 
don't like her personally? 
No. I like her very well. I think she is a 
And you didn't terminate her because you don't 
like women; did you? 
A. Certainly not. I work for a woman. 
Q. And you didn't terminate her because you got up 
on the wrong side of the bed that morning; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you didn't terminate her because you just 
felt like making an example of your power to the other 
people in the company; did you? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q, And you didn't terminate her because somebody 
else told you to; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. It was your decision. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So you didn't terminate her at will. You 
terminated her for a reason. Right? 
A. The reason was that the position was 
eliminated. 
Q. Okay. 
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A. And being an at will employer, then we could 
make the decision to terminate. 
Q. Are you claiming that you terminated her at 
will or are up claiming you terminated her because of 
economic circumstances? That's two different things, Paul, 
Which one? 
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
Q. Did you terminate her because of economic 
circumstances? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you believe that you are immune from this 
lawsuit because you are an at will employer? 
A. I believe that the company, as an at will 
employer, is in a position that this lawsuit is groundless. 
Q. So you think no matter what the reason the 
company has, this lawsuit is groundless? 
A. Yes. Just as I believe that my superiors could 
walk in today and terminate me, and pursuing this action 
would have no beneficial effect. 
Q. I assume you wouldn't want them to do that? 
A. I would there are days where I might 
prefer that they did, quite honestly. But no, not as a 
general course, I would prefer they didn't. 
Q. The record should reflect that Mr. Baird has a 
wink in his eye and a grin on his face in having said that. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. It is two different things, Paul, and I want 
you to make a distinction for me. You believe that this 
suit is groundless because Mrs. Fields is an at will 
employer. Right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But you are claiming that you terminated 
Mariamercedes for a reason, and that was the economic 
circumstances. Right? 
A. The underlying circumstances behind her 
11 
position being eliminated and her subsequent termination 
from Mrs. Fields was economic. 
Q. Thank you. Now, where did those economic 
circumstances develop? 
A. The origination of the Administrative Assistant 
position to me came about in April of 1989 when I added the 
position, that was not in the budget originally for the 
year, as a new director. As a new Director of Operations 
with the company, I felt I needed administrative support and 
I felt the field people who reported to me would need 
administrative support. So I formed, with my supervisor's 
permission, an unbudgeted position for the balance of the 
year in both the Administrative Assistant to me, and the 
Assistant to the Administrative Assistant to me. It sounds 
complex. So there were two additional people who were, in 
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